|
The central moral problem of government has always been to strike a
just and effective balance between freedom and authority. When freedom
degenerates into anarchy, the human personality becomes subject to
arbitrary, brutal, and capricious forces -- witness aberrations of
terrorism in even the most humane societies. (Bauman, 1982) Yet when the
demand for order overrides all other considerations, man becomes a
means and not an end, a tool of impersonal machinery. Human rights are
the very essence of a meaningful life, and human dignity is the
ultimate purpose of civil governments. Respect for the rights of man is
written into the founding documents of almost every nation of the
world. It has long been part of the common speech and daily lives of
our citizens. The obscene and atrocious acts systematically employed to
devalue, debase, and destroy man during World War II vividly and
ineradicably impressed on the world the enormity of the challenge to
human rights. It was to end such abuses and to provide moral authority
in international affairs that new institutions and legal standards were
forged after that war -- globally in the United Nations and in this
hemisphere in a strengthened inter-American system. (Chomsky &
Herman, 1979) The fact remains that continuing practices of
intimidation, terror, and brutality, fostered sometimes from outside
national territories and sometimes from inside, mark the distance yet
to be traveled before the community of nations can claim that it is
truly civilized. This is why the distinguished junior senator from New
York, Senator Moynihan, is surely right in stressing that human rights
should be not simply a humanitarian program but a political component
of American foreign policy.
For the difference between freedom and totalitarianism is not
transient or incidental; it is a moral conflict, of fundamental
historical proportions, which gives the modem age its special meaning
and peril. Our defense of human rights reminds us of the fundamental
reason that our competition with totalitarian systems is vital to the
cause of mankind. There is no reason for us to accept the hypocritical
double standard increasingly prevalent in the United Nations where
petty tyrannies berate us for our alleged moral shortcomings. On this
issue we are not -- and have no reason to be -- on the defensive. And
yet, while human rights must be an essential component of our foreign
policy, to pursue it effectively over the long term we must take the
measure of the dangers and dilemmas along the way. First, any foreign
policy must ultimately be judged by its operational results. To be
sure, the advocacy of human rights has in itself a political and even
strategic significance. But, in the final reckoning, more than advocacy
will be counted. If we universalize our human rights policy, applying
it indiscriminatingly and literally to all countries, we run the risk
of becoming the world's policeman-an objective the American people may
not support. At a minimum we will have to answer what may be the
question for several friendly governments: how and to what extent we
will support them if they get into difficulties by following our
maxims. And we will have to indicate what sanctions we will apply to
less well-disposed governments which challenge the very precepts of our
policy. (Dobriansky, 1989)
If, on the other hand, we confine ourselves to proclaiming
objectives that are not translated into concrete actions and specific
results, we run the risk of demonstrating that we are impotent and of
evoking a sense of betrayal among those our human rights policy seeks
to help.
Such a course could tempt unfriendly governments to crack down all
the harder on their dissidents, in order to demonstrate the futility of
our proclamations-this indeed has already happened to some extent in
the Soviet Union. Nor can we escape from the dilemma by asserting that
there is no connection between human rights behavior and our attitude
on other foreign policy problems-by "unlinking," as the technical
phrase goes, human rights from other issues. For this implies that
there is no cost or consequence to the violation of human rights,
turning our proclamation of human rights into a liturgical theme --
decoupled, unenforced, and compromised. Or else we will insist on our
values only against weaker countries, in Latin America or Asia, many of
which may even be conducting foreign policies supportive of our own.
This would lead to the paradox that the weaker the nation and the less
its importance on the international scene, the firmer and more
uncompromising would be our human rights posture. (Forsythe, 1990)
Second, precisely because human rights advocacy is a powerful political
weapon, we must be careful that in its application we do not erode all
moral dividing lines. We must understand the difference between
governments making universal ideological claims and countries which do
not observe all democratic practices-either because of domestic
turmoil, foreign danger, or national traditions -- but which makes no
claim to historical permanence or universal relevance. In the
contemporary world it is the totalitarian systems which have managed
the most systematic and massive repression of human rights. (Shoultz,
1980)
In recent decades no totalitarian regime has ever evolved into a
democracy. Several authoritarian regimes-such as Spain, Greece, and
Portugal -- have done so. We must therefore maintain the moral
distinction between aggressive totalitarianism and other governments
which with all their imperfections are trying to resist foreign
pressures or subversion and which thereby help preserve the balance of
power in behalf of all free peoples.
Our human rights policy owes special consideration to the particular
international and domestic setting of governments important to our
security and supportive of free world security interests. There are, of
course, some transgressions of human rights which no necessity -- real
or imagined-can justify. But there are also realities in the threats
nations face, either from terrorism at home such as in Argentina or
aggression across borders such as Iran or Korea. And we must keep in
mind that the alternative to some governments that resist
totalitarianism with authoritarian methods may not be greater democracy
and an enhancement of human rights but the advent of even more
repression, more brutality, more suffering. The ultimate irony would be
a posture of resignation toward totalitarian states and harassment of
those who would be our friends and who have every prospect of evolving
in a more humane direction. We must take care, finally, that our
affirmation of human rights is not manipulated by our political
adversaries to isolate countries whose security is important for the
future of freedom, even if their domestic practices fall short of our
maxims. (Stohl & Carleton, 1985) The membership of the UN Human
Rights Commission, composed as it is of a number of nations with
extremely dubious human rights practices, does not augur well for an
objective approach to this issue in the United Nations. Cuba and other
Communist governments, as well as the more repressive regimes of the
less developed world, have no moral standing to bring other nations to
international account. We should not hesitate to say so. Third, there
is the ominous prospect that the issue of human rights if not handled
with great wisdom could unleash new forces of American isolationism.
This could defeat the administration's goal of using it to mobilize
support for continued American involvement in world affairs. That the
human rights issue could develop a life of its own, regardless of the
administration's prudent sense of its aims and limits is already
evident from some developments in Congress. (Stohl, 1984)
A distorted or misunderstood human rights policy can become the
basis and justification of a modern isolationism. What appeals to many
as a useful impetus to resistance to the Communist challenge can be
used by others to erase all the distinctions between totalitarians and
those that resist them, to induce indifference to European Communist
parties' accession to power, or to disrupt security relationships which
are essential to maintaining the geopolitical balance. Excuses can be
found to deny help to almost any friendly country at the precise moment
when it faces its most serious external challenge. If conservatives
succeed in unraveling ties with nations on the Left and liberals block
relations with nations on the Right, we could find ourselves with no
constructive foreign relations at all, except with a handful of
industrial democracies. The end result ironically could be the
irrelevance of the United States to other nations of the world. A
policy of moral advocacy that led to American abdication would surely
condemn countless millions to greater suffering, danger, or despair.
Fourth and most fundamentally, we should never forget that the key to
successful foreign policy is a sense of proportion. Some of the most
serious errors of our foreign policy, both of over commitment and
withdrawal, have occurred when we lost the sense of balance between our
interests and our ideals. It was under the banners of moralistic
slogans a decade and a half ago that we launched adventures that
divided our country and undermined our international position. .
(Chomsky & Herman, 1979) A few years later young people were
parading in front of the White House carrying coffins and candles and
accusing their government of loving war; the national leadership was
denounced as excessively, indeed imperialistically, involved in the
internal affairs of other nations. A few years later still, the
government was attacked for sacrificing our ethical values on the altar
of detente and being insufficiently concerned with the domestic
behavior of other nations. Neither we nor the rest of the world can any
longer afford such extreme fluctuations. (Bauman, 1982)
Human rights policy in this period of American responsibility must
strengthen the steady purpose and responsible involvement of the
American people. It can do so only if it is presented in the context of
a realistic assessment of world affairs and not as the magic cure for
the difficulties and shortcomings of mankind's contemporary experience.
The administration is surely right in insisting that human rights is a
legitimate and recognized subject of international discourse; it is an
object of international legal standards -- importantly as a result of
American initiatives by administrations of both parties. At the same
time, we must recognize that we serve the cause of freedom also by
strengthening international security and maintaining ties with other
countries defending their independence against external aggression and
struggling to overcome poverty, even if their internal structures
differ from ours. We cannot afford to subordinate either concern to the
other. Morality without security is ineffectual; security without
morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between
these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our
government and our nation.
American Foreign Policy and China How to deal with the rising power
of China has become a question central to U.S. foreign policy. A strong
China could become a powerful adversary to the United States and the
current world order; a collapsing China with roughly one-fourth of
humankind would cast a shadow on the future of the world. Luckily, the
United States can influence the outcome: What China will become and do
depend largely on how the existing major powers, primarily the United
States, treat it. Thus, no other foreign policy issues deserve a higher
priority than does developing a peaceful, stable, and cooperative
relationship with China. (Barnett, 1996)
Washington's official China policy could be termed "constructive
engagement," but some analysts, unsatisfied with this approach, have
called for a new Cold War-style containment of Beijing; others have
proposed a "conditional engagement" policy. From the harsh hawks on the
far right to some of the most respected, moderate scholars, these
analysts have all assumed that China already sees or soon will see the
United States as its target or rival, and that Beijing clearly seeks
dominance or hegemony, at least in Asia.(Bernstein & Munro, 1997)
Unless and until China adopts a Western political system and
values--something these worried observers doubt will happen anytime
soon--the analysts contend that the United States must treat China's
empowerment as a threat. In short, Western observers have tended to
view China almost unanimously either as a new, Soviet-style source of
Communist revolution or as a Wilhelmine Germany bound to expand beyond
its borders when it becomes strong enough. Yet this debate has thus far
lacked a thorough discussion of China's strategic concerns and
intentions.(Christensen, 1996) Many analysts automatically assume that
the huge difference between U.S. and Chinese political systems and
values, and China's rapidly increasing capabilities, will necessarily
infuse Chinese power with an aggressive and challenging character.
Before the United States decides either to restrict and reduce Chinese
power or to employ various engagement strategies to try to change
it--either of which could be very expensive--it should ascertain the
strategic intentions and the likely international demands of the
Chinese leadership. Washington needs to rethink its China policy. China
does not necessarily threaten the United States, because the political
interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime--and thus
"official" Chinese national interests--differ markedly from the
nationalistic claims common to most rising powers. A window of
opportunity has appeared for the United States to accommodate and
incorporate China into the international system, effectively and
inexpensively, through a modus vivendi with the current political
regime in Beijing. By employing wise and proactive policies, the United
States can dampen and even eliminate the firewood before nationalistic
flames envelop China. Ironically, in the campaign to transform China
into a secure, satisfied, and thus peaceful major power in the
twenty-first century, the world should view the CCP regime in Beijing
as an ally, not as a target.
American Foreign Policy and Cuba The bitter rivalry between the
United States and Cuba has occupied a position as one of the principal
political disputes in the Western Hemisphere for the past 35 years.
Since the rise of Fidel Castro, the governments of these two countries
have placed themselves on opposite sides of almost every major regional
and global issue. They have long held vastly different ideas about what
constitutes a good and just government, what kind of international
behavior is legitimate, and the ends that foreign policy should serve.
Moreover, they have not only harbored political differences but also
maintained a very intense dislike of one another. The United States has
attempted to sustain a picture of Cuba as an international outlaw, the
source of much turmoil, crisis, and mischief in the world. Adding a
personal dimension to the attacks, the United States has also sought to
demonize Castro, creating and continually portraying an image of him as
the embodiment of evil. Although personal assaults do not often figure
largely in Cuban diatribes due to the presidential turnover in the
United States, Cuba continues to depict its closest neighbor as an
imperialist giant, abusing its power and contributing to, if not
responsible for, injustice, inequality, and misery throughout the
world. In sum, the relationship has been one of mutual hostility and
distrust, fueled by a combination of differences in ideology,
interests, culture, and power and exacerbated by geographic proximity
and contact.
|
|
|
(0 vote)