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Assuming that the burden of proof is ultimately on the writer, I
contend that the period from approximately 1900 until the United
States' intervention in the war, labeled the "progressive" era by
virtually all historians, was really an era of conservatism. Moreover,
the triumph of conservatism that I will describe in detail throughout
this book was the result not of any impersonal, mechanistic necessity
but of the conscious needs and decisions of specific men and
institutions.
There were any number of options involving government and economics
abstractly available to national political leaders during the period
1900-1916, and in virtually every case they chose those solutions to
problems advocated by the representatives of concerned business and
financial interests. Such proposals were usually motivated by the needs
of the interested businesses, and political intervention into the
economy was frequently merely a response to the demands of particular
businessmen. In brief, conservative solutions to the emerging problems
of an industrial society were almost uniformly applied. The result was
a conservative triumph in the sense that there was an effort to
preserve the basic social and economic relations essential to a
capitalist society, an effort that was frequently consciously as well
as functionally conservative.
I use the attempt to preserve existing power and social
relationships as the criterion for conservatism because none other has
any practical meaning. Only if we mechanistically assume that
government intervention in the economy, and a departure from orthodox
laissez faire, automatically benefits the general welfare can we say
that government economic regulation by its very nature is also
progressive in the common meaning of that term. Each measure must be
investigated for its intentions and consequences in altering the
existing power arrangements, a task historians have largely neglected.
I shall state my basic proposition as baldly as possible so that my
essential theme can be kept in mind, and reservations and intricacies
will be developed in the course of the book. For the sake of
communication I will use the term progressive and progressivism, but
not, as have most historians, in their commonsense meanings.
Progressivism was initially a movement for the political
rationalization of business and industrial conditions, a movement that
operated on the assumption that the general welfare of the community
could be best served by satisfying the concrete needs of business. But
the regulation itself was invariably controlled by leaders of the
regulated industry, and directed toward ends they deemed acceptable or
desirable. In part this came about because the regulatory movements
were usually initiated by the dominant businesses to be regulated, but
it also resulted from the nearly universal belief among political
leaders in the basic justice of private property relations as they
essentially existed, a belief that set the ultimate limits on the
leaders' possible actions.
It is business control over politics (and by "business" I mean the
major economic interests ) rather than political regulation of the
economy that is the significant phenomenon of the Progressive Era. Such
domination was direct and indirect, but significant only insofar as it
provided means for achieving a greater end-political capitalism.
Political capitalism is the utilization of political outlets to attain
conditions of stability, predictability, and security-to attain
rationalization —in the economy. Stability is the elimination of
internecine tion and erratic fluctuations in the economy.
Predictability is the ability, on the basis of politically stabilized
and secured means, to plan future economic action on the basis of
fairly calculable expectations. By security I mean protection from the
political attacks latent in any formally democratic political
structure. I do not give to rationalization its frequent definition as
the improvement of efficiency, output, or intemal organization of a
company; I mean by the term, rather, the organization of the economy
and the larger political and social spheres in a manner that will allow
corporations to function in a predictable and secure environment
permitting reasonable profits over the long run. My contention in this
volume is not that all of these objectives were attained by World War
I, but that important and significant legislative steps in these
directions were taken, and that these steps include most of the
distinctive legislative measures of what has commonly been called the
Progressive Period.
Political capitalism, as I have defined it, was a term unheard of in
the Progressive Period. Big business did not always have a coherent
theory of economic goals and their relationship to immediate actions,
although certain individuals did think through explicit ideas in this
connection. The advocacy of specific measures was frequently
opportunistic, but many individuals with similar interests tended to
prescribe roughly the same solution to each concrete problem, and to
operationally construct an economic program. It was never a question of
regulation or no regulation, of state control or laissez faire; there
were, rather, the questions of what kind of regulation and by whom. The
fundamental proposition that political solutions were to be applied
freely, if not for some other industry's problems then at least for
one's own, was never seriously questioned in practice. My focus is on
the dominant trends, and on the assumptions behind these trends as to
the desirable distribution of power and the type of social relations
one wished to create or preserve. And I am concerned with the
implementation and administration of a political capitalism, and with
the political and economic context in which it flourished.
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